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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE REACH OF THE COMMERCE
POWER OVER NONCOMMERCIAL ACTS
Cheffer v.Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995)
Nina Smith***
Appellants are pro-life activists contesting Congress authority under the
Commerce Clause' to enact the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
of 1990 (Access Act). 2 Although the Access Act has not been enforced
against Appellants, they assert that their First Amendment rights have been
chilled by potential enforcement of the Act against their anti-abortion
demonstrations. Appellants' foremost claim is that the Access Act is an
excessive congressional enactment that infringes upon the sovereignty
preserved for the states under the Tenth Amendment.4 The U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed Appellants' claims.' On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and HELD,
the Access Act is sustainable under the Commerce Clause.6
Congress commerce powers have long been regarded as plenary, limited
only by the Constitution.7 During the first third of this century, however,s
these powers were truncated under a narrow conception of "commerce."
* Editor's Note: This case comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the
outstanding case comment for Spring 1996.
** B.A., University of Florida, 1991. This comment is dedicated to Peter D. Smith, my
father.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3 (empowering Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
2. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1518-19 (lth Cir. 1995). Under the relevant
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1995), any person who "by force or threat of force or by
physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with" a person who is or
has been obtaining or providing "reproductive health services" is subject to civil fines or
criminal penalties.
3. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1519. Appellants advance several grounds for facially invalidating
the Access Act as an infringement on their First Amendment free-speech and free-exercise
rights. Id. at 1518-19. The district court's dismissal of these constitutional challenges, along
with the claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment for the
imposition of excessive fines, was affirmed by the appellate court. Id. at 1518-19.
4. Id. at 1519. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
5. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1519.
6. Id. at 1519-20.
7. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 271 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 3 (1824)).
8. United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1651-53 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court's formalistic commerce-clause analysis
required that an activity have a direct effect on interstate commerce to be
regulable.9 Further, activities like production and manufacturing were
These direct/indirect or
regarded as too local for federal regulation."
local/national distinctions were eliminated in a judicial era granting more
deference to congressional policy" and focusing on the practical, often
cumulative, effects of a regulated activity on interstate commerce. 12 In the
Court's ensuing commerce-clause jurisprudence, three categories of regulable
activity were generated. Congress may regulate (1) the channels of interstate
commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3) those
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 3 It is in this
last category, when analyzed in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 14 that Congress has come to enjoy expansive authority over local
activities.15
Among those cases departing from the early formalistic approach to
sustain regulation of intrastate activities is Wickard v. Filburn.'6 Faced with
a decline in U.S. wheat export, Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938 empowering the Secretary of Agriculture to control wheat
surplusage by establishing maximum yields for individual farms.' 7 The
Secretary enforced these allotments by imposing marketing penalties on
excess bushels.'" When appellee produced an excess of wheat for home
consumption, a penalty was imposed on that portion of his crop. 19 Appellee
unsuccessfully enjoined imposition of the penalty when the Court held that

9. Id. at 1652-53.
10. Id. at 1627, 1653.
cases upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court articulated
11. Id. at 1653. Inits
a rational basis test for challenges to Congress commerce authority. See Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) ("[W]here we find that the legislators, in light of the
facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme
necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end."); Heart of Atlanta,
379 U.S. at 262 ("[T]he means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end
permitted by the Constitution.").
12. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1653 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the cumulative-effects
doctrine of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942)).
13. Id. at 1629-30. Under the second category, Congress may "regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities." Id.
18 (empowering Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof').
15. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 271-72 (Black, J., concurring).
16. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
17. Id. at 115, 125.
18. See id. at 114-15.

19. Id.
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it was within Congress commerce powers to regulate the production of homegrown wheat not bound for the interstate market.2"
Because appellee's excess production reduced his need to purchase wheat
from the interstate market, the Court reasoned, that much less wheat would
be sold in commerce. 2 Focusing solely on the economic effects of an
intrastate act, the Court stated that although "[the act] may not be regarded
as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. 22 The Court
then emphasized that it was of no moment that the effect on commerce was
indirect.23 Moreover, no matter how trivial the amount of wheat produced
by appellee or how local its production, the practical effect of appellee's
private act on interstate commerce, in view of possible repetition among like
farmers, was held to be a substantial one.24
Twenty years later, the Court employed its reasoning in Wickard to
uphold Congress regulation of private acts of racial discrimination by local
restauranteurs in Katzenbach v. McClung.5 Pursuant to the enforcement
provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and of the
Commerce Clause, 26 and Congress' authority to make laws necessary and
proper to carry out these constitutional powers,27 Congress enacted Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to provide injunctive relief from discrimination at public accommodations. 28 This Act was enforced against appellees
for refusing dining-room service to African Americans. 29 Because appellees
made substantial purchases in interstate commerce of food products used in
the restaurant's operation, the restaurant was within the statutory category of

20. Id. at 125. Appellee also was denied a declaratory judgment that the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, as amended, violated his Due Process rights. Id. at 129-33.
21. Id.at 128.
22. Id.at 125.

23. Id.Earlier in its decision, the Court stated that "questions of the power of Congress
are not to be decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to
nomenclature such as 'production' and 'indirect' and foreclose consideration of the actual
effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce." Id. at 120.
24. Id. at 127.
25. 379 U.S. at 302. McClung was argued with Heart ofAtlanta, id.
at 295, in which the
Court upheld the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201 (b)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (1964), which created a per se category of lodging establishments that affected
interstate commerce because they hosted transient guests. Heart ofAtlanta, 379 U.S. at 24748, 258.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
28. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 245, 248. The relevant portions are § 201(b)(2),
pertaining to restaurants that "affect commerce," and § 201(c), defining "affect commerce"
in relation to those restaurants that serve interstate travelers or that make substantial interstate
purchases that are used in the restaurant's operation. McClung, 379 U.S. at 298.
29. McClung, 379 U.S. at 297.
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accommodations "affecting commerce."3 As part of their claim that these
provisions were outside Congress authority under the Commerce Clause,
appellees contended that the provisions created a presumptive category of
restaurants that "affect commerce," depriving them of a case-by-case
determination on that issue.3' The Court then looked to the facts before
Congress to determine whether such a regulatory scheme was rational.32
In the absence of formal legislative findings, the Court considered the
abundant testimony presented at congressional hearings.33 The record
showed that discrimination by restauranteurs reflexively reduced their per
capita sales and interstate purchases.34 Additionally, discrimination hindered
the mobility of African Americans who would need to eat on their interstate
travels.35 The Court thus held that the economic effects resulting from this
intrastate activity, when viewed in the aggregate, were substantial enough to
sustain Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a valid exercise of
Congress commerce power.36 Further, it was no bar to its authority that
Congress, from proffered testimony concerning the national scope of
discrimination, expounded that local acts might be repeated elsewhere to the
detriment of commerce.37 Citing both Wickard and the Necessary and
Proper Clause, the Court thus held that Congress rationally concluded that the
cumulative effects of local discriminatory acts meeting the statutory
conditions interfered with interstate commerce.38
The Court's focus, however, on the practical economic effects of local
activities, like the home consumption of wheat or private acts of racial
discrimination, has shifted. In United States v. Lopez, a 12th-grade student
was charged with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which
30. Id. at 298, 304.
31. Id. at 302-03 (citing a similar challenge brought in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941)), where the Court upheld Congress "determin[ation] that the payment of
substandard wages to employees engaged in the production of goods for commerce, while not
itself commerce, so inhibited it as to be subject to federal regulation" under the Commerce
Clause).
32. Id. at 299-301.
33. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 19; Senate Commerce Committee
Hearings, at 207).
34. Id. at 299-300.
35. Id. The Court also noted that racially discriminatory communities deterred new
businesses from establishing there. Id. at 300.
36. Id. at 300-01.
37. Id. at 301. According to the Court, "[w]ith this situation spreading as the record
Id.
shows, Congress was not required to await the total dislocation of commerce."
Additionally, in the companion case HeartofAtlanta, the Court stated that "Congress was not
restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was
dealing was also deemed a moral and social wrong." Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 257.
Thus, Congress appropriately considered the national scope of discrimination in connection
with the cumulative effect of local discriminatory acts. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 301.
38. McClung, 379 U.S. at 302-04.
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criminalized gun possession within a 1000-foot radius of a school.3 9 Faced
with a constitutional challenge to a federal criminal statute, the Court struck
down the Act as an excessive exercise of Congress commerce power.40 The
first decision invalidating a federal statute under the Tenth Amendment in
sixty years, 4' Lopez also is remarkable for its limitation on those acts
previously within Congress regulatory reach as substantially affecting
interstate commerce.4 2 Finding the link between gun possession at schools
and economic harm too generalized, the Court imposed the requirement that
the prohibited action be an economic one, citing both McClung and Wickard
for this proposition. 43 Additionally, the Court held that if a statute regulates
noneconomic activities, it must provide an express jurisdictional element to
"ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [prohibited act] in question
affects interstate commerce." 44
In an apparent departure from mere rationality review, the Court also
noted that the absence of legislative findings would hamper its evaluation of
whether Congress could rationally conclude that the prohibited act substan-

39. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 & n.1 (1995). Under the Gun-Free School Zones Act, it is a
federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."' Id. (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A) (1988)).
40. Id. at 1634.
41. Id. at 1652-53. In A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935), the Court employed a direct/indirect effects formula to strike down a wage- and hourfixing statute as an impermissible indirect regulation of interstate commerce. Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. at 1627-28. Federalism concerns that the government might otherwise become too centralized undergirded this formulaic approach. Id.
42. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630 (Note that this decision involves only the third category
of regulable activities. In this category, the Court clarified inconsistent precedent concerning
the requisite showing of an activity's effect on interstate commerce by stating that it must be
substantial.).
43. Id. In the holding that the Act is devoid of any commercial nexus, it is significant
that the Court interposed with a footnote effectively chastising Congress for attempting to
exercise broad police powers under the guise of its commerce power, in displacement of state
criminal law. See id. at 1631 n.3. According to some commentators, this language and the
tenor of the majority and concurring opinions in general signal a new era for states' rights,
though possibly only in the area of federal criminal legislation. See Gregory W. O'Reilly &
Robert Drizin, United States v. Lopez: Reinvigorating the Federal Balance by Maintaining
the States' Role as the "Immediate and Visible Guardians" of Security, 22 J. LEGIs. 1, 1-5

(1996).
44. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631. Because the Supreme Court did not explicitly limit
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce to these two requirements, some courts
have held that Lopez merely reaffirms precedent, although finding an instance where Congress
went too far. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding
the Access Act, reasoning that the "economic activity" language in Lopez is not a prerequisite,
as such a reading would be inconsistent with commerce-clause precedent); O'Reilly & Drizin,
supra note 41, at 9, 12 (discussing Lopez as restoring a balance of power between state and
federal governments by preserving to the states their police powers to the ultimate benefit of
an overburdened judiciary).
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tially affects interstate commerce.4 The Court then rejected the Government's argument that gun possessions in school zones substantially interfere
with the learning process, resulting in less productive students and ultimately,
a weak national economy. 46 After concluding that the prohibited action
"has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise," the
Court stated that the Gun-Free School Zones Act cannot be sustained as a
regulation of a local economic activity that in aggregate has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.47 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
looked at the prohibited action in isolation,4" stating that the "local student"
had not "move[d] in interstate commerce," and his prohibited possession did
not contain a jurisdictional element to ensure in this case that Congress has
constitutional authority for displacing state criminal law.49
In the instant case, the Eleventh Circuit was called upon to reconcile
Lopez with Congress contested authority under the Commerce Clause to enact
the Access Act.50 Responding to the heightened use of violence by the prolife contingent in its stance against the legality of abortions, Congress passed
the Access Act to provide remedies to abortion providers and recipients,
victimized by the pro-life campaign. 5
Specifically, section 248(a)(1)
exposes to a civil suit or criminal penalties any person who "by force or
threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or
interferes with" a person who is or has been obtaining or providing
"reproductive health services.' 52 Congress stated authority for passing the

45. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32. The Court did acknowledge that consistent with
its decision in McClung, formal findings were not required. Id. The dissent views the
differing outcomes in the majority holding and in McClung as turning on whether the act in
question is regarded as commercial or noncommercial. Id. at 1653-54 (Souter, J., dissenting).
According to the dissent, "calibrating the level of deference" by such line-drawing portends
a return to the abandoned formulaic approach, id., and to a judgment of legislation on the
merits, id. at 1656-57; see also cases cited supra notes II & 12 and accompanying text.
46. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33. The dissent thoroughly reviewed these arguments,
finding that gun possessions substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 1659-62 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1630-31. According to the dissent, however, the majority has recast McClung
and Wickard as cases in which an economic activity was involved, rather than noncommercial
activities with substantial economic effects. Id. at 1663-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120, 125.
48. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1664-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1634, 1630-31 & n.3.
50. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520.
51. Id. at 1519.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (Similar sanctions apply under subsection (a)(3) to a person who
"intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or attempts to do so, because
such facility provides reproductive health services." Under subsections (e)(1) and (5),
"reproductive health services" are defined as "medical, surgical, counselling [sic], or referral
services relating to the human reproductive system," provided in a "facility," including clinics,
hospitals, and doctors' offices.).
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Access Act was that such activities burdened interstate commerce.5 3
In determining that Congress had rationally concluded that the Access
Act regulates economic activity by protecting it from obstruction, the instant
court deferentially considered Congress findings.5 4 First, because patients
and doctors often travel across state lines to obtain or provide reproductive
care, an interstate market exists for those services." Second, the clinics
purchase their equipment through interstate commerce. 6 Third, because the
clinics operate within the stream of interstate commerce, Congress then found
that violence against providers and recipients of reproductive care, and
physical obstruction of clinic entrances, threatened, or halted interstate
commerce. 7 Apart from these indirect connections, none of the marshaled
facts pertained to the economic nature of the prohibited act.
On these findings, the instant court distinguished Lopez, in which the
Gun-Free School Zones Act lacked formal findings.5 Further, the instant
facts indicated that an economic activity, namely providing reproductive care,
was being regulated by being protected, whereas no economic activity was

53. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 488, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 724.
54. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520-21. The instant court adopted the analysis of the Fourth
Circuit in American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1995), which was
decided prior to the Lopez decision, and then independently considered the Access Act's
validity under Lopez. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1519-20.
55. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520. The findings indicated that women are more likely to cross
state lines when such services are scarce. H.R. REP. No. 306, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8
(1993), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 704-05. Scarcity occurs either because rural
clinics are targeted since they are the only facilities providing abortions within a reasonable
radius or because doctors are deterred from gynecological practice due to threats to and
murders of providers. Id. at 8-9, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 705-06.
56. Cheffer, 55 F.3d. at 1520. This includes "the purchase and lease of facilities and
equipment, sale of goods and services, employment of personnel and generation of income,
and purchase of medicine, medical supplies, surgical instruments and other supplies from other
states." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 488, supra note 53, at 7, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
724.
57. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, supranote 53, at 7, reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 724.
Though not cited by the instant court, Congress found that the interstate nature of the
nationwide pro-life campaign brought the violence, threats, and obstruction outside the range
of effective local and state law enforcement, thereby making this a proper subject of federal
legislation. H.R. REP. No. 306, supra note 55, at 6, reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 703.
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
113 S. Ct. 753 (1993), deprived women injured by the obstruction of abortion facilities of a
remedy under the Ku Klux Klan Act. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 488, supra note 53, at 7-8,
reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 724-25. On these findings, Congress concluded that federal
legislation is needed to safeguard the exercise of the constitutionally protected right to obtain
an abortion. H.R. REP. No. 306, supra note 55, at 6, reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 703.
58. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520. In Lopez, although the Court stated that Congress need not
advance formal findings, there is some indication that the majority applied a heightened
standard of review due to the absence of findings. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
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regulated in Lopez. s9 In a footnote, the instant court addressed the argument
that the Access Act did not regulate an economic activity but private acts of
protest that affected commercial activity.60 Stating that there is no precedent for the proposition that Congress power to legislate under the Commerce
Clause extends only to the acts of commercial entities, the court then cited
Supreme Court cases upholding federal statutes criminalizing private conduct
that substantially affected interstate commerce.6'
In the instant case, the court liberally construed the Lopez holding in
sustaining the Access Act provisions for both civil violations and criminal
penalties, as enacted under the Commerce Clause. Analyzing the Access Act
as a whole, seemingly under the third category of regulable activity, the
instant court held that the economic-activity requirement was met because
regulation of obstructive conduct in turn protected a commercial activity.6'
The court reached this conclusion by mingling the language of the second
category of regulable activity, that is, regulation and protection of persons or
things in interstate commerce, with that of the third, which was solely at
issue in Lopez.63 While the Access Act is possibly sustainable on both
grounds, 64 the "protect" language used here effectively enables Congress to
regulate "indirect effects" on interstate commerce.
However, Lopez
essentially restored the direct/indirect distinction by imposing an economicactivity requirement on the third category of regulable activity.65 Thus, the
"protect" proxy used in the instant case would cover a nonregulable activity,
itself noncommercial and therefore having only an indirect effect on interstate
commerce, albeit a substantial one.'

59. See Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520.
60. Id. at 1520 n.6. Here, the instant court was citing the lower court's decision in United
States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D.Wis.), rev'd, United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675
(7th Cir. 1995),petitionfor cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. May 20, 1996) (No. 95-1523)
(invalidating the Access Act on the grounds that it did not regulate economic activity).
Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520 n.6. In reversing the lower court, the Seventh Circuit in Wilson
sustained the Access Act as a valid regulation of conduct that interfered with persons engaging
in commercial activities, thereby satisfying the economic-activity requirement of Lopez.
Wilson, 73 F.3d at 683-84.
61. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520 n.6.
62. Id. at 1520. At this juncture, the instant court quotes Lopez: "Where economic
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained."' Id. (quoting Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630) (emphasis added).
63. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30.
64. See, e.g., Wilson, 73 F.3d at 687 (entertaining the argument but declining to hold that
the activities protected under the Access Act fall within a specious subcategory of acts,
protection of persons in interstate commerce, of the second category of activities reachable
by the commerce power).
65. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
66. See id. The dissent in Lopez criticizes the majority's formalistic approach, as it
suggests that "the Constitution would distinguish between two local activities, each of which
has an identical effect upon interstate commerce, if one, but not the other, is 'commercial' in

CASE COMMENTS

In another departure from Lopez, the instant court disputed the contention
that Congress may regulate only economic activities." In support of its
position, the Eleventh Circuit Court cites Supreme Court precedent upholding
under the Commerce Clause federal criminal statutes that penalize private
conduct.6" No mention is made, however, of the fact that those statutes
contained the requisite jurisdictional element.69 Moreover, the entire
opinion fails to address the jurisdictional element now required of criminal
statutes, and thus of the Access Act, under Lopez. It may be, however, that
given the Supreme Court's use of the word "ensure," the instant court views
the jurisdictional element as a safeguard, only to be required when a
noncommercial act is being criminalized, as in Lopez.7"
Such an analysis facilitates the instant court's validation of the Access
Act's presumptive categorization of acts that substantially affect interstate
commerce, thereby avoiding the case-by-case determination required for
criminal statutes.7 While this presumption was permissible upon favorable
judicial review in McClung,72 it may not suffice for criminal penalties under
Lopez. This is especially true, considering the Lopez Court's seeming
reversion to the direct/indirect nomenclature, at which it arrived by recasting
cases like Wickard and McClung as involving regulations of economic
activity." Such a revision of commerce clause precedent enabled the Lopez
Court to confine Congress regulatory powers to economic acts. If an act is
noncommercial, any effects on interstate commerce are by definition indirect
and must be proven in each case under the requisite jurisdictional element.74
Thus, legislation will be sustained only if the regulated act is commercial,
and has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
The instant court,

nature." Id. at 1663 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520 n.6.
68. Id.
69. Id. For example, the instant court cites Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985),
as sustaining 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), which criminalized destruction of property used in activities
affecting interstate commerce. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520 n.6.
70. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631; supra text accompanying note 44.
71. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. Section 248(a)(1) of the Access Act does not make
an express reference to safeguarding the availability of reproductive services that specifically
involve interstate commerce. Rather, Congress findings, describing obstruction of reproductive
services, support creation of a per se category of activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, supra note 53, at 7; see supra notes 53, 55-57 and
accompanying text for further discussion. Thus, any person who intentionally prevents another
person from obtaining or providing such services is deemed to engage in prohibited conduct
that necessarily interferes with interstate commercial activities. Id.
72. McClung, 379 U.S. at 302-03. For further discussion of the review in McClung, see
also supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
73. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1663-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 1631.

75. See id. at 1630.
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however, fails to require a jurisdictional element for the Access Act's
criminal penalties for conduct indirectly affecting interstate commerce.
Moreover, the instant court is clearly at odds with the Lopez Court's
formalistic approach when it refutes the proposition that Congress commerce
power reaches only "commercial actors, and not private individuals who
interfere with commercial activities in interstate commerce. 76
This refutation, however, aligns the instant case with the functionalist
approach of Wickard. 7 In Wickard, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
Congress may regulate "many kinds of intrastate activity," whether or not
commercial, so long as Congress rationally concludes that there is a nexus
with interstate commerce.78 This regulatory power was expanded further in
McClung when the Court held that Congress may use its commerce power
for the noncommercial purpose of prohibiting racial discrimination in
restaurants.7 9
Similarly, just as the noncommercial, home consumption of wheat
reduces the amount purchased interstate, noncommercial, obstructive conduct
interferes with commerce by preventing delivery of reproductive care.
Further, like the widespread racial discrimination in McClung, the national
scale of clinic violence makes the aggregate effects of obstructive conduct all
the more severe.80 After recasting Wickard and McClung as involving
economic activities, 8' Lopez would view any such noncommercial conduct
in isolation, rather than in light of its cumulative effects, which ensue from
what is a nationally mounted campaign.82
The instant case is a no-win decision. Consistent as it is with longstanding commerce-clause precedent, it sustains the Access Act's regulation
of what is, under Lopez standards, noncommercial private conduct, albeit
conduct that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. This result,
however, contravenes the Lopez holding, which extended commerce authority
either over economic activities with a substantial effect on interstate
commerce or over noncommercial private conduct when a constitutional
nexus is part of the government's prima facie case.83 This apparent

76. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520 n.6.
77. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. For further discussion see supra notes 21-24 and
accompanying text. In its abandonment of the direct/indirect distinction, the Wickard Court
noted that "'commerce among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical
one, drawn from the course of business."' 317 U.S. at 122 (quoting Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905) (Holmes, J.)).
78. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 122, 125.
79. McClung, 379 U.S. at 301.
80. For further discussion of the spread of violence, see supra notes 35, 55 and
accompanying text.
81. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1663-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1664-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1630-31.
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dilemma arises in a setting where a congress legislates in the wake of public
fury over appalling state crimes, and where the judiciary invokes federalism's
jealous reservation of police power to the states, though with an eye toward
reducing the explosion of criminal cases on the federal dockets. 84 Many
such policy issues will be asserted, and established commerce-clause
principles revisited, as courts decide the deluge of commerce power
challenges facilitated by Lopez. The instant case represents the first of those
cases to part the waters, still holding fast to established commerce-clause
principles.

84. See O'Reilly & Drizin, supra note 43, at 8-10.

